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STATm·1ENT OF THE CASI: 
In 1978, the Public Service Commission ("the Commission"), 
as a part of the original "Wexpro" hearing, concluded in its 1978 
Order that because certain properties, which were primarily oil 
producing, were not "used and useful" in the gas utility business, 
they were not "utility property" and therefore no jurisdiction 
existed in the Commission to examine the terms of Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company's {"MFS") proposed transfer of such properties to 
Wexpro Company {"Wexpro"). The Division of Public Utilities ("the 
Division") and the Committee of Consumer Services ("the Committee") 
appealed that Order to this Court, asserting legal error in that 
jurisdictional holding. 
In Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Service 
Commission, 595 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979) (hereafter "the Wexpro Case"), 
this Court rejected the classification of properties as utility or 
non-utility based on whether the properties primarily produced gas 
·or oil and remanded the case to the Commission to examine the 
proposed transfer of properties using a proper and specified 
jurisdiction test. 595 P.2d at 878. The Appeal in the Wexpro Case 
did not raise, and thus the Court's opinion did not decide, numerous 
questions concerning the proper sharing of benefits from the oil and 
gas properties owned by MFS and its affiliates or the power of the 
Commission to force MFS to conduct a ratepayer supported exploration 
program. 
-2-
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Taking this Court's decision in the Wexpro Case as 
direction and guidance, the Division and the committee negotiated 
with MFS and Wexpro to settle the property transfer issues dividing 
the parties. The resulting Stipulation ("the Stipulation") and 
Agreement ("the Agreement"} assumed that all of the affected 
properties were utility properties based on this Court's 
definitions. (Hereafter, the Stipulation and the Agreement may be 
collectively referred to as "the Settlement".) 
On August 3, 1981, MFS, Wexpro, the Division and the 
Committee presented the Commission with a summary of the Stipulation 
and Agreement, and their motion for approval of, the Settlement. 
The Commission set the matter for hearing on October 14, 1981, at 
which time the Utility Shareholders' Association ("Shareholders") 
and the Coalition of Senior Citizens ("the Coalition") entered_ their 
appearances. The proponents of the Settlement presented evidence 
r and argument during the course of hearings held on October 14, 15, 
! 16, 19 and 20, 1981, and November 23, 24 and 25, 1981. Prior notice 
of the hearings and the opportunity for the public to participate 
was published in a newspaper of statewide distribution for two 
~ consecutive days. The news media provided extensive coverage of the 
·~(hearings and of the opportunity for public comment. (Ord. at 4 
and 5.) 
After considering the extensive expert testimony, public 
:I~ comment, and argqment and explanations by counsel, the Commission 
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issued its Report and Order on December 31, l98i, approving the 
Settlement. On January 18, 1982, the Shareholders made application 
for rehearing. The Coalition and Utah Department of Administrative 
Services ("Administrative Services") also filed applications for 
rehearing dated January 20, 1982. All applications were denied by 
the Commission on February 9, 1982. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Committee and Division believe that the voluminous 
pages of "questions" presented for review by Appellants can fairly 
be reduc~d to the following: 
1. Could The Wexpro Litigation Be Settled? 
2. Does The Settlement Comply With The Law As Declared 
by This Court? 
3. Did The Commission Surrender Its Statutory 
Jurisdiction By Approving The Settlement? 
4. Does The Order Clearly Express The Commission's 
Intent As To Its Finality? 
SUMMARY OF DIVISION AND COMMITTEE POSITION 
Based on the clear power given it by statute and the clear 
legislative purpose of encouraging settlement of controversies, the 
Commission acted lawfully and properly in approving the Settlement. 
Based on the overwhelming and unanimous expert testimony below, the 
-4-
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Settlement was in the public interest and its terms complied with 
the law as declared by this Court in its Wexpro decision. In 
essence, the Settlement resolves the dispute between MFS and its 
ratepayers by the mechanism of selling the ratepayers' interest in 
the disputed properties to the shareholders in exchange for a 
retained interest in the oil and gas produced from the properties. 
While this solution results in the properties being transferred out 
of MFS's utility accounts and thus presumptively out of the 
Commission's jurisdiction, it does not affect the statutory scope of 
the Commission. By submitting the Settlement to the Commission for 
approval and a determination that the transfers are in the public 
interest and for fair market value, the parties recognized the 
:i Commission's authority to regulate the terms of such transfers. 
Finally, as made eminently clear by the Commission's language in its 
Conclusion of Law #6, the Order was intended to be final as to those 
properties treated by the Settlement. 
In short, no grounds exist for criticizing the Commission 
Order approving the Settlement; rather, the Commission's action 
should not only be upheld on appeal but applauded as a responsible 
and considered step to resolve a veritable Pandora's Box of 
-litigation. 
~ 
~ 
~ 
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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Brief of MFS and Wexpro contains a satisfactory outline 
of the testimony presented at the hearing below. The Division and 
the Committee hereby adopt that discussion and incorporate it by 
this reference. 
The material found at pages 16 - 29 and at pages 38 - 45 of 
Administrative Services Brief provides a largely irrelevant but 
adequate summary of the history of the Wexpro controversy and what 
the Division and the Committee would have argued had there been no 
Settlement. Because this material may be useful background to the 
Court, it is hereby incorporated by this reference with the caution 
that it does not address the issues before this Court on appeal, to 
wit: whether the Commission's Order approving the Agreement is 
supported by law and the factual record made during the Commission's 
hearings on the Settlement. 
B. INACCURACIES IN APPELLANTS' FACTUAL STATEMENTS 
The Administrative Services' and the Coalition's statement 
of the terms of the Settlement is so colored with argument that the 
Division and the Committee find it necessary to provide its own out-
line of the Settlement. First, however, the Division and Committee 
must correct certain misstatements and erroneous conclusions 
contained in the Briefs of Administrative Services and the Coalition: 
-6-
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Inaccuracy #1: "There Was No Determination Below of the 
Public Interest." (Admin. Serv. Br. at 1) 
For eight days, the Commission heard testimony and 
argument on whether the terms of the Settlement were in the public 
interest. The Commission explicitly found that the Settlement was 
in the public interest. (Order at Findings of Fact #8, #9, and #11; 
Conclusions of Law #4 and #5) s 
Inaccuracy #2: "The Commission Took No Evidence and Made 
No Finding as to the Fair Market Value of the 
Properties Transferred Under the Agreement." 
(Admin. Serv. Br. at 1) 
The record below is replete with expert testimony from 
1 
highly respected oil and gas experts that the Agreement passed to 
the ratepayers, fair market value consideration for the ratepayers' 
interest in properties transferred under the Agreement. (Tr. 1024, 
1025, 1045, 1155-56, 1165, 1173, 1249, 1251, 1261, 1263, 1328, 1353, 
1487 and 1711.) Based upon this unambiguous record, the Commission· 
·specifically found that fair market value consideration had been 
passed in the transfers effectuated by the Agreement. (Order at 
Findings of Fact #10 and #11; Conclusion of Law #5). 
Inaccuracy #3: "It was the Division's Position That All 
Profits From Oil 0perations Were to Reduce 
Natural Gas Prices." (Admin. Serv. Br. at 7) 
Nei~her in the wexpro Case (Case No. 15835) nor in the 
1977 hearings before the Commission has the Division argued that all 
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MfS oil profits should reduce natural gas rates. (See Tr. 674-75, 
707, 743-44; Joint Brief of Petitioners in Case No. 15835 at 85 
{1978)). 1 It was always the law, as well as the understanding of 
the Division and the Committee, that a portion of the oil profits 
would be retained by the shareholders to compensate for that risk of 
development assumed by the shareholders and to provide a return on 
the shareholder capital investment in the properties. This Court 
did not, in its Wexpro opinion, dictate how the oil profits would be 
divided between the shareholders and the ratepayers, leaving that 
issue to the expert discretion of the Commission. 
Inaccuracy #4: "The Division Gave Up Its Right to Represe.nt 
the Public Interest Before the Commission." 
{Admin. Serv. Br. at 10) 
Although this is not a factual issue, and hence will be 
dealt with, infra at Section C, no place in the Stipulation or the 
Agreement does the Division waive any right it might have to contest 
MFS's or Wexpro's performance under the Stipulation or the Agreement 
or to contest any other action or non-action by these entities as it 
relates to their operations under the jurisdiction of the Commission. 
If anything, the Agreement and Stipulation expand the power of the 
!The cited transcripts indicate that Mr. Berman (with whom 
Administrative Services' counsel was associated at the time) expressly 
represented that the Division did not advocate that all of the oil 
profits should be utilized to reduce gas rates. 
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Division, because it will monitor and contest matters thereunder 
which it otherwise legally believes are non-utility in nature. 
Inaccurracy #5: "The Commission Failed to Hold a Hearing as 
Ordered by This Court." (Admin. Serv. Br. at 11) 
This Court ordered as part of the Wexpro Case that the 
Commission hold a hearing to determine whether any of the oil 
properties proposed to be transferred to Wexpro were utility 
properties and thus subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. 
Because the Settlement implicitly assumes all properties transferred 
were "utility properties", the "hearing" yearned for by 
Administrative Services was unnecessary. The Court should note that 
for eight days in October, November and December, 1981, the 
Commissi'on took testimony from factual, expert, and public witnesses 
for the express purpose of determining whether the Settlement was in 
harmony with this Court's opinion in the Wexpro Case. (Order at 
Conclusions of Law #1; Tr. 931, 932-33.) The nearly one thousand 
pages of transcript in the designated record on appeal bear strong 
testimony that indeed an appropriate hearing resulted from this 
Court's remand. 
Inaccuracy #6: "MFS's Exploration Program Ended When the 
Settlement was Approved." (Admin. Serv. Br. at 12) 
The MFS exploration program ended when MFS terminated 
the Joint Exploration Agreement in 1980. MPS.thereafter gave notice 
of its intention not to acquire additional unexplored acreage into 
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MF3 utility accounts for future exploration, and to cease 
developmental and exploratory drilling on all leases then in MFS. 
Far from stopping an ongoing drilling program, the Settlement 
ensures that an energetic exploration and development drilling 
program will continue to exist to the b~nefit of the ratepayers of 
this state. {Tr. 1018, 1019, 1023, 1030, 1143, 1158, 1226, 1232, 
1244, 1252, 1272, 1273, 1280, 1320, 1398, 1485, 1688.) 
C. LITIGATION RESOLVED BY THE SETTLEMENT 
During the pendency of Case No. 76-057-14 (the Wexpro 
Case), MFS received general rate increases in Case Nos. 77-057-03, 
79-057-03, 80-057-01 and 81-057-01. The Orders establishing the 
overall increase in rates entered in each of those cases has been in 
some way connected to the outcome of the Wexpro Case. 
Wexpro issues were raised by the Wyoming Public Service 
Commission in Docket No. 9192 Sub 68 in 1980 and 1981. 2. 
In 1980, MFS, Wexpro, Mountain Fuel Resources, Inc. 
3 (Resources) and Celsius Energy Company (Celsius) filed 
Applications with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 
2The Settlement attempts to deal with all issues for both 
Utah and Wyoming. The Wyoming Public Service Commission approved 
the Settlement, and its Order has now become final and unappealable 
by the passage of time. 
3Mountain Fuel Resources, Inc. and Celsius Energy Company are 
subsidiaries of M9untain Fuel Supply Company. 
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FERC Docket Nos. CP80-274, CPB0-275 and CIB0-233 seeking 
authorization for the transfer of the properties subject to the 
Agreement from MFS and Wexpro to Celsius, a subsidiary of Entrada 
Industries, a subsidiary of MFS. Resolution of these Applications 
in favor of MFS, absent the Settlement, could have resulted in the 
end of cost-of-service gas in Utah. Mid-Louisiana Gas co. v. 
F.E.R.C., 664 F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1981). 
Also in 1980, MFS, Wexpro and certain shareholders of MFS 
filed a Complaint in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah in Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service 
Commission of Utah, Civil No. C-80-0710J. The Complaints, as 
amended and supplemented, claimed that the regulation of MFS 
properties by the Commission violated various provisions of the 
Constitution of the United States. The District Court entered an 
Order dismissing the Complaint, but without prejudice to refiling 
after the Commission and this Court had acted. 
In 1981, MFS attempted to transfer properties to Celsius 
without FERC or Corn.mission approval. Upon challenge of these 
transfers by the Division and the Committee, a preliminary 
restraining order issued from the Commission pending further 
hearings on the propriety of the proposed transfers. This 
litigation was designated Case No. 81-057-04. 
The FERC, Commission, Wyoming PSC, and federal court 
litigation as well as the remand case and rate cases here on appeal 
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were part of a protracted, time-consuming, expensive and disruptive 
battle which has cost the people of Utah over Four Million Dollars 
($4,000,000.00) in legal fees alone since January 1, 1977. 
(Tr. 940, 1149, 1480). 
D. THE SETTLEMENT 
The Court has before it in the designated record the full 
Agreement and the Stipulation which attempts to put to rest all of 
the litigation described above. It should be understood that the 
Settlement attempts to resolve many points of controversy which 
were not before this Court in the Wexpro Case. Because of the 
scope of the lrtigation which the Settlement seeks to resolve and 
the somewhat arcane nature of the oil and gas business, the 
Stipulation and Agreement are not light reading. Consequently, the 
Division and the Committee provides below what they hope and 
believe is a fair and readable summary of the most significant 
aspects of the Settlement. 
1 d . G . 4 • Pro uct1ve as Reservoirs. 
The depreciated book investment in currently gas-producing 
leases, wells and appurtenant facilities (which primarily produce 
4Administrative Services and the Coalition attempt to find 
an "issue" when they accuse the Settlement of partaking of the 
"discredited MFS classification system." While for clarity and 
precision reservoirs were classified as "gas" or "oil" in the 
Settlement, that classification served no jurisdictional purpose 
and hence is not violative of the Wexpro Case. 
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cost-of-service natural gas, together with some natural gas liquids 
and oil) have historically been accounted for in the MFS rate-base 
account 101, upon which MFS earned a rate of return. 5 All 
investment and ownership of these wells and appurtenant facilities, 
and the rights to production from these wells (but not the leases) 
will be retained by MFS. All natural gas, natural gas liquids and 
oil produced from these reservoirs will belong to the utility and 
regulated by the Commission. Wexpro will operate these wells and 
facilities on a service contract basis, but will make no profit for 
that service. The terms of the service contract were approved by 
the Commission as part of the Settlement. 
Because many of these reservoirs are not perforated by a 
sufficient number of wells to adequately produce all available gas, 
future developmental drilling will be required. The Agreement 
requires Wexpro to perform all necessary developmental drilling at 
its sole risk and expense, and specifically requires Wexpro to 
expend a minimum of Forty Million Dollars ($40,000,000) within the 
first five (5) years of the Agreement's· term for developmental 
5These wells and the reservoirs from which they produce, 
along with any appurtenant facilities, are to be distinguished 
from the lease which, for any particular surface area, governs 
legal rights to all strata below the s~rface, some of whic~ may be 
above and some below the reservoirs which are currently being 
produced by the wells and facilities in the MFS 101 account. 
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drilling. When and if Wexpzo achieves a suc~essful developmental 
well in these reservoirs, it will capitalize that investment in a 
special account similar to a rate-base account, and will add to its 
service fee billings an amount equal to the base-rate of return (to 
6 
compensate for the cost of money) plus eight percent (8%) (to 
compensate for the risk inherent in developmental drilling) on that 
investment. All natural gas produced from developmental drilling 
will belong to the utility and be delivered at cost-of-service. 
However, because of the risk involved in drilling developmental 
wells, and because Wexpro will bear that risk solely and entirely, 
the natural gas liquids and any oil which may be produced from a 
successful developmental well will not belong to the utility 
solely, but will be shared, with the ratepayers getting fifty-four 
percent {54%) of the net profits, as described in subsection 2, 
infra. Provisions are made in the Agreement for close monitoring 
to assure that all wells which are successful developmental wells 
are so declared and provide cost-of-service gas to the utility. 
2. Productive Oil Reservoirs. 
The Settlement properties called "Productive Oil 
Reservoirs" are essentially those that were the focus of the Court 
in the Wexpro Case. Because ratepayers had borne a large part of 
6A floating rate based on returns to a group of unrelated 
regulated utiliti~s, initially, sixteen percent (16%). 
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the risk of exploring these properties, it was implicitly assumed by 
the parties that these were "utility properties" and that a signifi-
cant portion of the profits from these properties should be applied 
to reduce gas rates. This philosophy is implemented as follows: 
(a) after expenses and a qase rate of return7 are 
achieved by Wexpro from these properties, the ratepayers 
will receive fifty-four percent (54%) of all profits from 
the sale of oil and natural gas liquids from these 
properties whether produced from existing wells or 
developmental wells drilled in the future. 
(b) all natural gas produced from these properties 
will be sold by Wexpro to the utility at a cost-of-service 
'price specified in the Agreement and approved by the 
Commission; (because these are primarily oil-producing 
properties to be owned by Wexpro, this cost-of-service 
price is contractually guaranteed, as opposed to 
Commission-set as with Productive Oil Reservoirs, supra.) 
{c) the profit element in the Agreement's cost-of-
service calcuiations is a base-rate of return of sixteen 
percent {16%), 8 which will fluctuate annually {up or 
down) based on an index of unrelated regulated companies; 
7see note 6, supra. 
8This corresponds to the rate of return currently allowed by 
the Commission in equity investment. 
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(d) all expenditures for enhancement of oil recovery 
and/or development drilling on these properties will be at 
9 the sole risk and expense of Wexpro; 
(e) MFS will retain all of the common stock of Wexpro. 
3. Exploratory Properties Held by MFS. 
Exploratory properties are unexplored formations underlying 
a lease which may or may not already have production from another 
formation. Hence, there are exploratory properties underlying the 
MFS 101 account leases (producing gas leases), underlying the MFS 
105 account leases (totally unexplored leases), and underlying the 
Wexpro oil properties. The Agreement provides that all leases will 
be transferred from MFS's 101 and 105 accounts to Wexpro. Wexpro or 
Wexpro's
1
assignee will explore these properties at its sole and 
. . k d 10 entire r1s an expense. Anything that is produced in the 
9To the extent that development drilling is successful, a 
five percent (5%} premium will be allowed in addition to the base 
rate of return on investment in successful wells to compensate for 
the risk of developmental drilling. Further, in the event the 
total profitability of Wexpro sinks below a certain minimal level, 
a two-point incentive rate of return may also be collected by 
Wexpro on new investment in enhanced recovery procedures. 
lOThe Settlement does not attempt to resolve the issue of 
whether Wexpro is a utility. The Division and Committee note, 
however, that the requirement for fair market value consideration 
for the transferred properties is inconsistent.to its being a 
utility inasmuch as transfers between utilities of property must 
always be at book value so as to avoid an inflated rate base 
burdening ratepayers. Further, with Wexpro bearing all the risk 
and expense of exploration, it is in a classic non-utility 
posture. City of El Dorado v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm., 362 
S • W • 2 d 6 8 0 ( A·r • 19 6 2 ) . 
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future from these unexplored formations, whether oil, natural gas 
liquids, natural gas, or other minerals, will be sold and the 
ratepayers will receive seven percent (7%) of the gross revenues 
from any such production or the utility may take its seven percent 
(7%) royalty in kind. 11 Further, MFS will have the first right to 
purchase at market for its ratepayers any natural gas which is 
discovered in the future on any of these exploratory properties, 
thus assuring, to some degree, future supplies of natural gas to 
Utah ratepayers. The seven percent (7%) royalty assures that gas 
from these properties will always come net to the ratepayer at below 
market prices. 
ll 
4. Exploratory Properties Never Held by MFS. 
1 There are some properties dealt with by the Settlement 
which have never been held in an MFS utility account. Some of these 
properties are producing properties which were never capitalized into 
the rate base. There are also unexplored.properties which Wexpro 
acquired directly into its accounts after January, 1~77 ("After-
~ Acquired Properties"). The Agreement provides that the utility 
obtains no interest of any kind either in producing properties 
1, 
llProvisions are made in the Agreement to assure that, in 
the event Wexpro needs to use farm-out or other joint venture 
n arrangements to adequately explore these prope~ties, the utility's 
royalty interest will be preserved or improved, contrary to the 
bald and baseless assertion by the Appellants that room for 
mischief exists. {Admin. Serv. Br. at 54) 
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acquired directly into a non-utility account, or in exploratory 
properties acquired directly into Wexpro after 1977, with two very 
valuable exceptions: 
(a} On approximately one hundred twenty-eight thousand 
(128,000) acres of unexplored property acquired by Wexpro after 1977 
but before May 10, 1979, the utility is granted a two and one-half 
percent (2.5%) gross royalty, similar in operation to the seven 
percent (7%) royalty described in subsection C-3, above. 
(b) On certain acreage in the San Juan County; Utah, area 
known as the "Bug Field," the utility is also given a two and 
one-half percent (2.5%) gross royalty even though this acreage was 
acquired after May 10, 1979, or was acquired through farm-in 
arrangements where Wexpro bore the entire risk of exploration. 
From all the acreage affected by the exceptions, MFS has a first 
right to purchase all natural gas, which, by virtue of the royalty, 
will always come net to the utility at below-market prices. 
5. Other Consideration. 
The Agreement gives the ratepayers Twenty-One Million 
Dollars ($21,000,000.00) to reduce rates in the first year of the 
Settlement in addition to the proceeds of the various properties. 
Also, each year for twelve (12) years, the ratepayers get an 
additional Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00) rate 
reduction. 
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E. BENEFITS OF THE SETTLEMENT 
Any attempt to quantify the benefits which flow to the 
ratepayers by reason of the Settlement must of necessity be based on 
assumptions concerning rates of production, future market price of 
gas and oil and levels of success in deyelopmental and exploratory 
drilling. Consequently, the following estimates are very gross 
attempts to quantify the benefits accruing to the ratepayer as the 
result of the Settlement. 
m 1. Cost-of-Service Gas is Preserved. 
The Agreement assures that the Utah ratepayer will continue 
u to receive cost-of-service gas from the existing productive oil and 
gas reservoirs. Witness Roseman, a nationally respected expert (Tr. 
f 
1009-14f, testified that the preservation of this cost-of-service 
gas was the greatest single benefit of the Agreement. (Tr. 1017-19.) 
' . . 12 th lt1
1 
By protecting this gas from the FERC s NGPA pr icing, e 
5, 
. 12The Agreement was carefully drafted with an eye to the 
pending MFS applications before the FERC. Protection of low-cost 
gas against the imposition of significantly higher NGPA prices by 
the FERC in the Agreement and Stipulation was a hard-won and 
important concession to the ratepayer. 
The Agreement intentionally provides that the utility will 
retain ownership of all the currently producing gas properties. 
(Agreement at III-5.) The statutory and case law is clear that 
without a sale to MFS there can be no federal jurisdiction of this 
transaction under the Natural Gas Act. United Gas Pipeline Co. v. 
Mccombs, 442 u.s. 529, 531 (1979). FPC v. Trans-continental 
Pipeline co., 365 u.s. 1, 8, 23-24 (1961); Wessely Energy Corp. v. 
Arkla Gas co., 5Q3 F.2d 917, 920 (10th Cir. 1979)'" 
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ratepayers are benefited nearly Two Billion Dollars ($2,000,000,000) 
over the next twenty (20) years. (Exhibit S-2) 
2. Ratepayers Will Get the Majority Share of Net Oil Benefits. 
The Agreement provides an immediate flow to the ratepayer 
of fifty-four (54%) of the net profits from the oil properties. 
Wi tnes_s Roseman, an important participant in the Settlement 
negotiations and a nationally prominent consultant on natural gas 
12continued: Gas produced on the currently productive 
properties transferred to Wexpro will belong to Wexpro, but it is 
all dedicated to MFS at cost-of-service. The Agreement 
contractually guarantees both the price (Commission-approved 
cost-of-service) and supply (all to MFS) of this gas. (Agreement at 
II-5.) If FERC exercises jurisdiction over this gas, the contract 
price (cost-of-service) will be applied and the MFS parties will 
fully cooperate with the Division and the Committee to obtain this 
end. (Stipulation at 15.5.) See United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Mobile 
Gas Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338 (1956); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. 
F. C • C . , 6 6 5 F. 2 d 13 0 0 , 13 0 3 ( D. C • Ci r • 19 81 ) ; Mi s s is s i pp i Va 11 ey Gas 
Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 659 F.2d 488, 498 (5th 
Cir. 1981). 
Pursuant to the Stipulation (15.1), MFS has amended its FERC 
Applications to reflect the Settlement and has withdrawn the request· 
for FERC jurisdiction over most of the subject properties. If this 
Court strikes down the Agreement, MFS would undoubtedly return its 
FERC Applications to their prior, highly dangerous state, which 
would be its legal right. 
Before December 1981, the Division and the Committee had a 
"backstop" position at FERC: high NGPA pricing had not been allowed 
by FERC to similar gas. In FERC Orders 57 and 98 (issued in 1980), 
FERC declined to treat sales of a jurisdictional company's own gas 
to itself, even from a subsidiary, as "first sales" under the NGPA, 
thus maintaining cost-of-service prices. In December 1981, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down these Orders and required 
FERC to apply NGPA pricing to intracorporate transfers of gas. 
Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Reg. Com'n., 664 F.2d 530, 
538 (5th cir. 1981). The Agreement thus remains the only sure means 
by which cost-of-service pricing can be preserved for the customers 
of MFS. 
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regulation, indicated that the Division and Committee were well 
justified in accepting less than one hundred percent (100%) of the 
profits from the oil in light of the equities and the other terms of 
the Agreement. In fact, the fifty-four percent (54%) figure 
actually achieved was better than what ~oseman had established in 
his mind as an appropriate figure. (Tr. 1024.) This i tern could 
yield over Two Hundred Fifty Million Dollars ($250,000,000.00) to 
the ratepayers over twenty (20) years based on 1981 results. 
3. Vigorous Exploration Is Provided. 
The Agreement has mechanisms whereby the benefits to the 
consumer are combined with incentives to Wexpro to encourage 
t• vigorous development of existing oil and gas reservoirs and to 
:t 
explorat'ion for additional reservoirs. In contrast to the hiatus l! 
ili in exploratory a~d developmental drilling that existed before the 
11 , ,, 
i Settlement, the Agreement provides a framework of incentives for 
m 
vigorous exploration and development of oil, natural gas and natural 
gas liquids. 
:ui111 
(Tr. 1024A, 1514-15.) The record shows that by 
~ ~esigning the consideration for the exploratory properties on an 
ti 
overriding royalty basis, the "lure of the big strike" will be an 
incentive to the vigorous and energetic exploration of these 
- properties which would not exist were the product to be priced at 
!ij)1 
1ai cost-of-service. (Tr. 1143, 1149-52, 1226, 1397.) This is an 
l~~I 
iid 
important step in assuring future supplies of gas for Utah 
ratepayers. {Tr. 1273.) 
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4. Ratepayers Are Given a Stake in Future Success on 
Exploratory Acreage, but Bear No Risk of Future Failure. 
The entire risk of failure on the exploratory properties 
will be borne by MFS shareholders. This is a complete redirection 
from the past whereby MFS was allowed tq expense exploratory risk 
through its rates. The result of the former program was often 
near-market "cost-of-service" gas and no share of the oil. Under 
the Agreement, the shareholders bear the total risk and the 
ratepayers get below-market gas through a seven percent (7%) 
royalty. This royalty comes "off the top" (Tr. 1523) and, because 
of the high cost of today's exploration, it is by no means a fact 
that the seven percent (7%) gross royalty will provide less benefits 
to the ratepayer than would cost-of-service gas from these 
properties, with the ratepayers bearing the expenses and risk of 
13 
exploration. (Tr. 1057, 1231, 1455.) Assuming the success 
13witness Roseman considered the seven percent (7%) roY.alty 
not only "reasonable" but "fairly high" and indeed a "generous 
slice." {Tr. 1026.) ~oreover, the first right to purchase 
natural gas from the exploratory properties, which would belong to 
the utility under the Agreement, is a very valuable benefit. As 
witness Kirsch indicated: 
At the present time there is enough gas being produced in this 
area to meet demand by additional connections which are 
continually being added to MFS's system and additional supply 
will be more difficult to acquire. Three {3) years ago there 
was a shortage of gas and the right to call upon production at 
market price was of great value. When in a world where all 
energy is in ~hort supply, this call on gas is of significant 
importance. 
(Tr. 15 24. ) 
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level on new exploration on this property that was historically 
experienced by MFS, ratepayers could obtain another Two Hundred 
Million Dollars ($200,000,000.00) in benefits over twenty years. In 
addition, the elimination of exploratory costs from MFS retail gas 
rates will save the ratepayers at least an additional $3 million 
dollars annually. 
5. Rates Are Further Reduced by a Variety of Other 
Settlement Provisions. 
The reduction of rates by the various elements of the 
Settlement are multiple and continuingo The removal of all leases 
from the MFS rate-base accounts yields immediate rate reduct~ons of 
ili approximately $2 million annually. During the first twelve (12) 
months of the Agreement's operation, Twenty-One Million Dollars 
($21,000,000.00) in rate reductions will immediately flow through to 
reduce rates, and the continuing Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollar 
($250,000.00) annual cash payment will further reduce rates. Thus, 
in sum, the Agreement sets the groundwork for continued low-cost gas· 
for the MFS customers. 
6. Litigation is Ended. 
There is no justification for litigation unless an 
h important principle needs to be vindicated or a sure economic 
benefit awaits the winner. In this case, the principle (juris-
r 
:tdiction) was won in this Court in the original Wexpro decision, but 
t 
the ultimate financial benefit to the ratepayers was in limbo. 
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Barring settlement, any financial benefit of the Wexpro Case would 
be postponed for many years pending the outcome of interminable 
litigation. In 1980, the parties found themselves in a position 
where politically and economically, in the absence of compromise, 
the only solution was increasingly vigorous litigation in every 
forum availableo The estimates by counsel as to the costs of this 
litigation since 1977 yielded a frightening figure in excess of Four 
Million Dollars ($4,000,000.00) which the ratepayer in Utah has paid 
through both taxes and MFS rates. However, even this Four Million 
Dollar ($4,000,000.00) figure is deceptively small. Because of the 
increased tempo of litigation and inflation, fully one-third of that 
figure was incurred during 1981 alone. The projection of future 
costs of' litigation from this point forward, should the settlement 
not be affirmed, conservatively reaches an additional Seven Million 
Dollars ($7,000,000.00). This would be money down the proverbial 
rat hole. The record is clear that after five (5) to seven (7) more 
years of litigation, if and when the ultimate consumer position 
eventually triumphed in all the administrative agencies and all 
courts, what was left of cost-of-service gas, the oil profits and 
unexplored properties might not be enough to justify what had been 
expended in the litigation. 
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la II. ARGUMENT 
A. ON REMAND FROM THIS COURT, THE PARTIES WERE NOT PRECLUDED FROM 
SETTLING THE ISSUES COVERED IN THE STIPULATON AND AGREEMENT 
1. The Commission Is Statutorily Empowered to Approve 
Settlements of any Case Before It. 
The statutory powers of the Commission were significantly 
roijt expanded in 1981 with the amendment of § 54-7-10 (1), u.c.A. as 
follows: ~aii 
10~ At any time before or during a hearing or proceeding before the Commission, the parties 
between themselves or with the Commission or any 
Commissioner, may engage in settlement 
conferences and negotiations. The Commission may 
at its sole discretion adopt any settlement 
proposal of the parties and enter an order based 
1 upon such proposal if it deems such action proper. 
~ It is apparent from the clear language of the statute that the 
~ Legislature intended for the Commission to be able to act as it did 
~ in this case to avoid wasteful and disruptive litigation. 14 
14settlements are encouraged and supported by reviewing 
courts in the energy regulatory context, even when not all parties 
~ agree with the settlement. Penn. Gas & Water Co. v. FPC, 463 F.2d 
12 4 2 { D • c . c i r • 19 7 2 ) ; c i ties of Lexington , et a 1. v • E • P . C • , 2 9 5 
~ F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1961). The Coalition attempts to dismiss the 
statute by saying the Commission could not approve a settlement 
contrary to law, citing Gorgoza, Inc. v. State Road Comm'n, 553 
P.2d 413 (Utah 1976). Neither the case nor the Coalition's logic 
apply. First, Gorgoza dealt with an agreement withou~ s~ecific 
statutory authority. second, while we agree the Comrn1ss1on may 
not approve unlawful terms regardless of the power to app~ove . 
settlements in g~neral, the terms of the Agreement and St1pulat1on 
are lawful, as amply shown in Section B, infra. 
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2. This Court's Wexpro Decision Did Not -- Indeed Cannot 
-- Bind the Commission's Regulatory Discretion -- Nor 
Did It Preclude Settlement. 
Both the Coalition and Administrative Services attempt to 
cast the Wexpro Case as a twin to United States v. El Paso Natural 
Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 662 (1964), and thereby entice this Court to 
reverse to assert its reviewing authority. The El Paso case has no 
relevance to this appeal. 
That both El Paso and the Wexpro Case ordered remands is 
the sole point of congruity. In El Paso, the order was directed to 
a lower court and explicitly ordered total divestiture. The lower 
court in El Paso, bound by the Supreme Court's detailed directive, 
/ 
had no remaining discretion. Naturally, when subsequent appeals 
showed that total divestiture was not accomplished, the Supreme 
Court reversed. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas 
Co., 386 U.S. 129 {1967); and then Utah Pub. Serv. Comrn's v. El 
Paso Natural Gas Co., 394 U.S. 1009 (1969). 
This Court's holding in the Wexpro Case declared 
jurisdictional law, but directed no specific plan or result. The 
Commission was to factually determine whether properties were 
"utility" or "non-utility" and thereafter to use its expertise and 
discretion to deal with these properties and their benefits. As a 
remand to an administrative agency, the Wexpro decision could 
properly declare legal principles to be utilized in determining 
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which properties were utility properties but could not bind the 
commission's discretion to formulate an appropriate regulatory 
treatment to be accorded such properties. 
As a body rich with the expertise to regulate the natural 
gas utilities of this State, the Commission received a remand which 
t~ was thus properly restrained. The law regarding the role of the 
M court on the one ~and (to establish the law) and the role of the 
Commission (to regulate the industry) is clear and settled. An 
administrative agency is entrusted by statute with specified 
regulatory authority. On review, this Court determines the law, 
t~ 
but once the Court has declared the law, the Commission fashions 
the relief. The agency is free, within the declared law, to take a 
totally 1new approach to the problem. NLRB v. Food Store Employees 
Union, 417 U.S. 1 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 
(1947); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting, 309 U.S. 134 (1940).. City 
of Cleveland v. FPC, 561 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and C.& N.W. 
Transp. Co. v. U.S., 574 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1978), cases cited by 
the Coalition, are not to the COJ"ltrary. 
This allocation of responsibilities is clearly provided 
for in Utah's statutory scheme of utility regulation. The 
Commission is broadly empowered to "regulate and supervise all of 
n~ 
the business" of a public utility, § 54-4-1, U.C.A., and to 
establish "just and reasonable" rates, § 54-4-2 U.C.A. In 
contrast, this court's review is limited to determining whether the 
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Commission acted constitutionally and within the scope of its 
statutory authority. Section 54-7-16, U.C.A. Thus, this Court is 
without authority to prescribe appropriate rates of return for 
regulated utilities or fix prices to be paid by ratepayers for 
utility services. 
Directly contrary to the allegations of the Appellants 
(Admin. Serv. Br. at 42-44, 60), numerous factual, policy and legal 
issues were left by this Court for possible decision by the 
Commission on remand. The following is a small list of some of the 
issues confronting the Commission for resolution after this Court's 
Wexpro decision: 
What could Wexpro or Celsius charge for gas supplied 
to MFS without violating the "no-profit-to affiliates 
rule"? (595 P.2d at 874) 
What would the Commission determine to be the proper 
return on investment if it declared the oil properties 
to be utility properties? (595 P.2d at 874) 
How much risk capital would the Commission recognize 
as having been contributed by MFS shareholders to the 
exploration program and how would that impact on the 
Commission's division of benefits from the oil and gas 
properties? (595 P.2d at 874, 880) 
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:a 
er 
Which specific properties were "utility" properties 
within the guidelines of this Court? were properties 
acquired by Wexpro directly from third parties' 
"utility" properties? (595 P.2d at 877) 
What consideration would t~e Commission recognize as 
fair market value for the ratepayers' interest in the 
oil properties? (595 P.2d at 878) 
What would be the "appropriate benefit" to the 
ratepayers after a fair market value sale of 
property? (Id.) 
What split of Joint Exploration Agreement properties 
and benefits should occur? (595 P.2d at 880) 
/3. Judicial Precedent Supports the Commission's Approval 
of the Settlement. 
Federal courts have developed a uniform approach when 
examining settlements involving the interest of the public. While 
the United States Supreme Court's principal decision, Protective 
Committee for Independent Stockholders of TMT Tracker Ferri, Inc. 
ze 
~~! 
v. Anderson, 390 U.S. fl4 (1968), involved judicial approval of a 
compromise in a Chapter X bankruptcy proceeding, the principles 
announced there have been applied to various proceedings where 
court approval of settlement litigation tinged with public interest 
were involved. See,~, Karson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 
U.S. 79 (1981) (c~vil rights action) : McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee 
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Corp., 565 F. 2d 416 (7th Cir. 1977) (class action settlement) ; 
Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
1039 (1973) (stockholder's derivative action); State of West 
Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N. Y. 1970), 
aff'd 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir 1971) (class action settlement). These 
principles, and their satisfaction by the Commission below, can be 
summarized as follows: 
(a) Is the Settlement a Fair and Reasonable Compromise of 
the Public's Claim? 
The trial court in Pfizer explained that "[w]hether to 
approve [a] compromise involves an exercise of discretion." 314 F. 
Supp. at 740. See also, § 54-7-10(1) U.C.A. A settlement should 
be approved if it is "fair, reasonable, and adequate". Obviously, 
as noted in Pfizer, "these terms are general and cannot be measured 
scientifically." 314 F. Supp. at 740. 
The Pfizer Appellate Court further explained: 
It appears to be well settled that in reviewing 
the appropriateness of the settlement approval, 
the appellate court should only intervene upon a 
clear showing.that the trial court was guilty of 
an abuse of discretion. 
440 F.2d at 1085. In Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d at 693, the Second 
Circuit explained the discretion involved in making a decision as 
to the reasonableness of a settlement: 
••• [I]n any case there is a range of 
reasonableness with respect to a settlement - a 
range which recognizes the uncertainties of law 
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and fact in any particular case and the concomi-
tant risks and costs necessarily inherent in 
taking any litigation to completion - and the 
judge will not be reversed if the appellate 
court concludes that the settlement lies within 
that range. 
See also In Re Prudence Co., Inc., 98 F.2d 559, 560 (2d Cir. 
1938). The Commission, utilizing its special expertise and 
ie compet~nce, found the Settlement to be fair and reasonable and in 
l! 
the public interest. (Order at Findings of Fact #8 and #10.) 
(b) The Court Should Not Try the Controversy in the 
Course of Approving the Settlement. 
Any virtue which may reside in a settlement is 
based on doing away with the effect of such a 
decision. 
Pfizer, ~14 F. Supp. at 741. (Citing In Re Riggi Bros. Co., Inc., 
11 42 F.2d 174, 176 (2nd Cir. 1930)). 
It!~ ••• [T]he very uncertainties of outcome in 
litigation as well as the avoidance of wasteful 
litigation and expense, lay behind the Congres-
sional infusion of a power to compromise. This is 
a recognition of the policy of the law generally 
to encourage settlement. This could hardly be 
achieved if the test on hearing for approval meant 
establishing success or failure to a certainty. 
Pfizer , 4 4 o F. 2 d a t 1 O 8 5 , 1 O 8 6 (emphasis added ) (quoting from 
Florida Trailer & Equipment Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th 
Cir. 1960)). The Commission specifically applied this standard, as 
shown in its Conclusion of Law #3. 
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(c) Does the Judgment of Experienced Counsel Support the 
Settlement? 
The ability and competence of counsel representing the 
parties is of great weight. Pfizer, 314 F. Supp. at 741. The 
record shows the prevailing view of the participants that competent 
and e~perienced counsel represented the parties. (Tr. 1158, 1232) 
The Commission so noted below. (Order at Finding of Fact #12.) 
All counsel for MFS, Wexpro, the Shareholders, the Committee and 
the Division recommended the Settlement. 
(d) The Settlement Should Be the Result of Good Faith 
Arm's Length Bargaining. 
The Court must also be satisfied that a settlement is the 
I 
result of "good faith bargaining at arm's length." Pfizer, 314 F. 
Supp. at 741. In the present case, the tough adversarial nature of 
the negotiations leading up to the settlement was noted to be the 
most vigorous and difficult in the memory of the participants 
(Tr. 1015, 1115, 1179.), giving the Commission that assurance of 
the fairness of the Settlement. (Order at Finding of Fact #7.) 
(e) Did Bi-Partisan Support Exist for the Settlement? 
In Pfizer, the strong support of most, though not all, of 
the parties was persuasive to the trial court in approving the 
Settlement, 314 F. Supp. at 743. In this case, witness after 
witness with decades of regulatory experience (Tr. 1009-14, 
1095-1100, 1190-92, 1216, 1245-46, 1324-25, 1466-67) testified that 
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o[ 
the Settlement was fair, reasonable and adequate. (Tr. 1030, 
1149-51, 1195-96, 1232, 1252, 1279-80, 1330-31, 1397-98, 1385, 96, 
1525-26.) There was no credible evidence to the contrary. 15 The 
Division and Committee, the parties charged by law with 
representing the interests of the customers of MFS in this State, 
along with the management of MFS and Wexpro unanimously and without 
qualification supported the Settlement. It is important to note 
the Division and the Committee were the first to challenge the 
Wexpro issues in 1976 and successfully fought the 1978 appeal in 
the Wexpro Case. Their support for the Settlement is significant 
evidence of its fairness. 
B. THE SETTLEMENT IS LAWFUL, CONFORMING TO THE HOLDING AND 
GUIDANCE OF THIS COURT 
1. The Commission's Factual Findings and Conclusions 
Supporting the Settlement Are Presumptively Correct. 
The only real question raised by the Coalition and 
Administrative Services is not did the Settlement and the 
Commission's Order comply with this Court's directives - tney did. 
Their Complaint goes t~ the findings of the Commission that fair 
market value was received for the properties and that the public 
lSsome public witnesses, out of an established ignorance of the 
scope and terms of the Settlement, testified against the 
Settlement. No expert qualified before the Commission supported 
~their position, h6wever. 
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and ratepayer interest is served by the Agreement. (Order, Findings 
of Fact #8, #9, #10 and #11.) Those Findings are presumptively 
16 
correct and are due great deference in the face of the merely 
conclusory attacks by Appellants, who had plenty of opportunity to 
present persuasive contrary evidence be~ow but did not. The "straw 
mantt of noncompliance with this Court's Opinion is baseless. 
2. The Settlement's Implicit Classification of Properties 
Pursuant to the Wexpro Case Criteria Recognized 
Commission Jurisdiction and Negated the Requirement 
of a Remand Hearing. 
By the Settlement, all properties transferred from MFS to 
Wexpro under the Agreement were transferred for fair market value 
16tt •.• The Findings and Conclusions of the Commission on 
questions of fact shall be final and shall not be subject to review 
••• tt {§ 54-7-16 U.C.A) This Court will not disturb findings of 
the Public Service Commission which are supported by competent 
evidence. 
[I]t is not required that the facts found by the Commission be 
conclusively established, nor even that they be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence. If there is in the record 
competent evidence from which a reasonable mind could believe 
or conclude that a certain fact existed, a finding of such fact 
finds justification in the evidence, and this Court cannot 
disturb it. 
PBI Freght Service v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 598 P.2d 
1352, 1355 (Utah 1979). See, also, Empire Electric Association, 
Inc. v. Public Service CommissTOn;" 604 P.2d 930 (Utah 1979} ; Utah 
Parks Co. v. Kent Frost Canyonland Tours, 19 Utah 2d 252, 430~d 
171 (1967); Utah Gas Service Co. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 18 
Utah 2d 310, 422 P.2d 530 (1967); Lewis v. Wycoff Co., 18 Utah 2d 
255, 420 P.2d 264 (1966); Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission, 13 Utah 2d 72, 368 P.2d 590 (1962). 
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~!t nd a ft er a Co mm i s s. ion finding that the transfer was in the pub 1 i c 
interest. 595 P.2d at 878. The submission of the Agreement to the 
Commission tacitly recognized the Commission's jurisdiction over 
the transfer. (Stipulation at § 1.25; Order at Conclusions of Law 
~ #1 and #3.) Thus, the hearing mandated by this Court's Order of 
Remand, to determine whether the properties were utility properties 
~ would have served no useful purpose, since the parties effectively 
conceded for purposes of the Settlement that all of the transferred 
t~ 
l! 
properties were utility properties. 
3. Ratepayers Now Share in the Profits from the 
Oil-Producing Properties. 
In the Wexpro Case, this Court recognized that the 
ratepayers had borne much of the risk of exploration of the oil 
properties and were entitled to share in the profits produced from 
these properties. 595 P.2d at 873, 878-79. The Agreement gives to 
~ . . ~ ratepayers the majority of net profits from the 011 production 
D! 
V! 
fa~\ 
(Agreement, § II.) and the natural gas produced from ·oil-producing 
wells is committed to the MFS utility system at cost-of-service. 
(Id.) 
4. Gas is Provided at as Favorable a Rate as Reasonably 
Possible. 
This Court recognized a "duty" on the part of MFS to 
~"give to the consumers the most favorable ratecreasonably 
an 
Jpossible." 595 P.2d at 874. Nowhere in the Wexpro Case is MFS 
~ 
ia 
~ 
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charged simply to provide the lowest possible rate. This Court was 
careful only to require the "most favorable rate reasonably 
possible." The unanimous expert opinion in this record is that the 
Agreement is in the best interest of both the shareholders and the 
customers, (~, Tr. 940, 943, 1017, 1149, 1267, 1480), and the 
negoti~tions were tough and frequently threatened to end in 
failure. The rate reductions which will be achieved under the 
Settlement can logically be said to be the most favorable rates 
reasonably possible. 
In a colloquy between Chairman Bernard and Witness Ritzma, 
the Associate Director of the Utah Geological Survey, the following 
exchange occurred: 
Q. Mr. Ritzma, you were involved in the last 
case, or, the first part of this case. What is 
your opinion regarding the order that the 
Commission entered into in that case and the 
stipulation? Which is more advantageous to the 
ratepayer and the general public? 
A. Oh, I think the present stipulation is a much 
better solution to the .•• problem. It 
provides a vehicle for Wexpro to get back into 
active exploration and the -- let's say the 
existence of an active exploratory arm of the 
public utility here I think is vital to the 
interests of the people in the State of Utah so 
that they can be provided with -- continue to be 
provided with gas at a reasonable rate. 
Q. (Com. Cameron:) Well now, did your answer 
refer to the order of the Commission and the 
overruling of that order by the Supreme Court, or 
was it just the order of the Commission prior to 
it going to the Supreme Court? 
-36-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l! 
A. I was comparing the state of affairs prior to 
let's say, prior to the proposal that the 
Commission made prior to the decision of the 
Supreme Court and to the present settlement. The 
present settlement is much to be preferred and 
provides a solution. 
(Tr. 1272-1273.) 
5. No Risk Capital Will be Provided by Ratepayers. 
This Court criticized the provision of "risk capital" 
by ratepayers. 595 P.2d at 874. The Agreement resolves this 
"problem" by requiring that all development and exploration risk be 
borne by shareholders. (Stipulation § 1.23; Agreement, § II - 8, 
~ IV - 5.) No expense will be allowed in any rate paid by MFS 
1l~~ customers which is traceable to exploration or development expense. 
Further, no increments to either the MFS rate base or the investment 
base of Wexpro are allowed which represent unsuccessful exploration 
expenses. Thus, under the Agreement, the entire risk of explora-
tion is shifted to the shareholders and away from the customers. 
6. "No Profit-to-Affiliates Rule" Is Met. 
The charge by Administrative Services and the 
Coalition that potential sales of gas from currently unexplored 
properties to MFS at market prices, and the retention by Wexpro of 
46% of the net profit from oil operations, violate the 
"no-profit-to-affiliates rule", and hence the Wexpro decision, 595 
P.2d at 875, is without substance. The only aspect of the prior 
arrangement which this Court found violative of the rule was that 
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Wexpro was permitted to charge market prices for gas from 
properties for which it paid book value consideration. 515 P.2d at 
875. Necessarily, no such arrangement exists in the Settlement. 
While a literal and extreme interpretation of the term 
"no-profit-to-affiliates" would require that NO profit, not even 
a return on investment, be paid by a utility to an affiliated 
company, this reading is not consistent with the authorities on 
which the Court relied in discussing the rule in the Wexpro 
. . 17 
op1n1on. 
When applied to purchases of goods or services by 
utilities from affiliates, which will not be included in the rate 
base but rather in the cost of service, courts use the "no profit-
to-affil~ates" rule as a regulatory tool to ensure, on a case by 
17only in cases dealing with construction of utility plant by a 
subsidiary does "no profit" really mean !!2. profit. In Florida Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 362 F.2d 331, 334 
(5th Cir. 1966), the Fifth Circuit noted that the "no profit-to-
affiliates" rule began in the Federal Power Commission case of 
·Alabama Power Co., 1 FPC 25 (1932). There, the FPC refused to 
allow a utility to pay a profit to a subsidiary for construction 
work which would ultimately be included in Alabama Power's rate 
base and upon which cost Alabama Power would earn a rate of return. 
It is this rule which this Court applied in Utah Power and 
Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 152 P.2d 542 (Utah 1944). 
There, certain affiliates known as the "Phoenix Companies" did 
construction work for Utah Power & Light Co. Finding that the 
Phoenix Companies were nothing more than a department of UP&L 
without independent assets or business purpose, this Court disal-
lowed profits paid to the Phoenix Companies from the UP&L rate base. 
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case basis, that a utility does not use "sweetheart" relationships 
with its affiliates to inflate profits to inappropriate levels. 
Under the majority rule, an affiliate is allowed to receive a 
"reasonable profit" if market forces or a similar independent factor 
determines profit. See Washington Water Power v. Idaho Public 
Utilitl, 617 P.2d 1242, 1248-49 (Ida. 1980) and cases collected 
there. The Tenth Circuit in Cities Service Gas Company v. Federal 
Power Commission, 424 F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1969) noted the real 
problem: 
Intra-company transactions cannot be used to 
create an artificial or inflated price to be 
charged consumers • • • • 
t· 424 F.2d at 416 (Emphasis added) (cited at 595 P.2d at 874-75) o 
Because Cities Service shareholders had received the total 
$21,450,000 in profit realized by the utility on the sale of gas 
producing property, additional profit through market price sales of 
~ gas back from that property were improper. However, it should be 
noted that in Cities Service cost-of-service pricing which included 
). 
an element of profit in the form of return on investment was 
permitted. 
In the present case, since the Settlement provides 
consideration directly to the ratepayer (as opposed to the 
shareholder) in the form of 7% gross royalty on the production from 
unexplored properties at no risk, true market price sale of gas back 
l· 
- to the utility does not violate the rule. Similarly, the retention 
of 46% of the net profits of oil and liquid gas sales is an 
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appropriate owner's share after paying the ratepayers fair market 
value for their interest in the property. 
Finally, the participation by the Division and Committee in 
the negotiation of the Agreement ipso facto removes the abusive 
"sweetheart" characteristics necessary for the application of the 
"no-pr_ofi t-to-affiliates" rule. See, generally, Central Telephone 
Co. of Va. v. Va. State Corp. Commission, 252 S.E.2d 575 (Va. 1979). 
The terms of the Settlement were negotiated at arm's length (often 
an "arm plus a baseball bat" Tr. 1015), and thus the Commission 
could properly conclude that the Settlement does not violate the 
"no-profit-to-affiliates rule". 
7. Undeveloped Acreage Is Recognized as Utility Acreage. 
This Court's Opinion recognized that "the undeveloped 
acreage may properly be deemed an asset of the gas plant .•• ". 
595 P.2d at 875. The Agreement assumed that the unexplored acreage 
was "utility" property. This acreage, including the unexplored 
portion of producing properties, were transferred for a fair market· 
value consideration and (subject to the approval of the Commission) 
in accordance with the requirements of this Court. 
8. All Property Transfers Were For Fair Market Value. 
(a) Fair Market Value Requires a Split of That Value 
Between Shareholders and Ratepayers. To assure ratepayers of an 
"appropriate benefit" from the transfers of MFS property to Wexpro, 
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this Court indicated, that such transfers be for fair market value. 
595 P.2d at 878. The Agreement achieves this objective. It is 
e\ important here to recognize that neither the shareholders nor 
ratepayers own one hundred percent {100%) of the interest in any 
utility property. The relative interests of the shareholders and 
~ 
ratepayers in any disposition of property are determined, on a case 
~ by case basis, largely by the doctrine of "gain follows risk." This 
determination of interests was settled and the benefits divided 
accordingly by the Settlement. 
The "gain follows risk" rule does not dictate that all gain 
goes to the ratepayers. As the D.C. Circuit emphasized in 
Democratic Central Committee v. Washington Metro Area Transit 
Commission, 485 F.2d 786, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1973): 
~ 
The ratemaking process involves fundamentally 
'a balancing of the investor and the consumer 
interests' •••• In terms of property value 
appreciations, the balance is best struck at the 
point at which the interests of both groups 
receive maximum accommodation •••• 
~Accord: Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 78 P.U.R.3d 321, 324 {~ich. 
1~ 1968), part of oil reve?ues to shareholders as rate of return) 
Casco Bay Lines, 11 P.U.R. 4th 172 {Maine 1975) {shareholders 
allowed to retain ten percent {10%) of the gross revenue from sale 
w of utility property) ; Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Corporation 
~ 
n Commission, 620 P.2d 329, 341 (Kan. 1980) (reversed P.S.C. order 
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granting all the profit from the sale of a utility asset to the 
ratepayers, ordering sharing with shareholders). Certainly, 
nowhere in the Wexpro Case did this Court mandate a fixed formula 
for sharing of revenues from the property transfer examined there, 
leaving to the Commission the expert de~ermination of "an appro-
priate benefit" to the ratepayers. 595 P.2d at 878. 
(b) Production-Based Consideration is Fair Market 
Value. All property transfers made by the Agreement are in return 
18 for a percentage of revenues from actual future oil and gas 
production, not for hypothetical and arbitrary dollar values 
estimated at the time of transfer. These streams of revenue will 
be receiv~d without the ratepayer paying one dime of the expense 
or risk bf explorationa 
Both Administrative Services and the Coalition assume 
that because no dollar "value" for these properties was 
established, ipso facto the properties were not purchased for fair 
value. This assertion ignores common sense, industry practice, 
·and the voluminous record below. The value of oil and gas 
properties depends upon the size of the hydrocarbon deposits 
18such a percentage is either realized in the form of receipt of 
product at below market prices (as in cost of service gas) or 
directly paid to ratepayer through the 191 Account. 
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existing on the properties, how quickly they can be produced, market 
prices pertaining to the product less the cost of production and 
treatment of the product. None of the elements can accurately be 
predicted in advance. Even the best statistical tools available for 
estimating the values of producing properties yield only highly 
speculative results. (Tr. 1155-56, 1261, 1488, 1490.) 19 This is 
axiomatic with respect to unexplored properties, because there is no 
~ reliable means of determining the conditions which prevail thousands 
of feet below the surface of the land without drilling a well. 
Hence, any dollar value appraisal of such properties is necessarily 
ill imprecise and naturally leads to the practice of trading oi~ and gas 
properties based on a retained percentage of production rather than 
a dollat value appraisal. (Tr. 1045, 1487-88). Percentage of 
production consideration is a practice recognized by government 
~ 19counsel is aware of one well not involved in the MFS/Wexpro 
matter which produced at only a few barrels per day for a year, 
~, yielding a certified estimate of reserves based on that production 
rate. In just the last sixty (60) days, through no extra effort by 
the operator, the well has begun producing hundreds of barrels per 
day, rendering yesterday's expert appraisal worthless. Had a "fair 
market" dollar value been used to sell the property before the 
unforeseen increase in production, the seller would have been 
poorly served. Conversely, counsel is also aware of a field 
estimated last year, based on production at that time, to have a 
certified reserve figure of 60,000+ barrels of oil. Suddenly 
of production fell and now an estimate gives only a 13 ,000 barrel 
reserve. Any dollar value previously fixed w~uld be challenged for 
fraud by the disappointed buyer. 
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as well as industry. A principal goal of the 1978 Amendments to the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 u.s.c. § 1331 et seg. 
(1976 ed., Suppl. III), was to assure receipt of fair market value 
for potentially oil-rich offshore tracts leased by the Federal 
Government. The Act specifies that the consideration will be in 
terms of a retained percentage of production. Additionally, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recently held that the Secretary of the Interior 
acted properly in awarding offshore leases in return for percentage 
of production consideration. Watt v. Energy Action Educational 
Foundation, 50 U.S.L.W. 4031 (December 1, 1981}. 
{c) The Record Below Supports the Commission's Finding 
of Fair Market Value. The Commission heard from highly qualified 
experts bn the economic aspects of the oil and gas industry 
including: Howard Ritzrna, Associate Director of the Utah Geological 
Survey; Lyle Hale, former Vice-President of Exploration for Mountain 
Fuel and now an independent consulting geologist; Herman Roseman, a 
nationally respected expert in natural gas regulation; Ralph Kirsch, 
a twenty-year veteran of oil and gas exploration and President of 
Wexpro; and James Harmon, a New York investment banker with 
extensive familiarity with the oil and gas industry. All gave their 
expert opinion that the consideration transferred to the ratepayers 
for their interest in the transferred properties was fair market 
-44-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
value. (Tr. 1025, 1029, 1045, 1165, 1173, 1249-51, and 1328.) 
This testimony was in the record for over a month while the 
Coalition and other parties were given time to gather evidence 
against it. When the hearing reconvened, not one qualified witness 
20rn the context of challenging the Commission's finding that fair 
market value was passed for the property transfers, the Coalition 
argues that because of the massive pending litigation that the 
Division, Committee and Commission were bludgeoned into approving an 
exchange of properties for less than fair market value 
consideration. (Brief at 18-19). This conclusion is difficult to 
understand. The Division and the Committee had won at every turn: 
the Federal District Court case was dismissed, MFS's FERC ~ applications were stymied by Division action, and based on 
preliminary rulings before the Commission, the prospects of a 
favorable result by the Division and Committee before the Commission 
in the remand hearing were great. Surely, the pressures on MFS to 
settle were just as great as they were on the consumer side. 
cil 
:1l1 
Witness Harmon, a member of MFS' Board of Directors stated: 
••• I mean I can't help but say whoever represented the 
State -- and I include the lawyers here and their experts 
-- did a phenomenal job on behalf of you all, or the 
ratepayer, whoever you want to say. I don't think -- I 
think it was too expensive and I don't think it w~s fair 
for the shareholder but I think we should do it. Someone, 
if this thing ever gets resolved, did a very good job on 
that side. I ·hope they're on my side some day. (Tr. 1158). 
Witness John O'Leary, former Deputy U.S. Secretary of Energy, 
1~!1 agreed: 
With regard to the customers, I think that they're very 
well served by the agreement. I marvel at the negotiating 
skills of the people who represented them. (Tr. 1232). 
-45-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
disputed the prior expert testimony concerning receipt of fair 
k 1 f h t . 21 mar et va ue or t e proper ies. 
9. The Settlement is in the Public Interest. 
This Court required that any sale of utility property be 
both for fair market value and in the public interest. 595 P.2d at 
878. The Commission found the Settlement in the public interest. 
(Order at Findings of Fact #8, #9 and #11). It must be understood 
that the public interest is not necessarily equivalent to gas now at 
the cheapest price possible. It is in the public's long-term 
interest first to assure future supplies of gas, and second, to get 
it at the most favorable price possible. The only way to assure 
future supplies of gas is to provide incentives for energetic and 
vigorous exploration and development of potential gas-bearing 
properties. It is also in the public interest to obtain the 
immediate flow of Agreement-provided benefits to the consumer to 
cushion the inevitable rise in gas prices rather than continuing a 
21Richard Rosenburg testified, on behalf of the Coalition, 
concerning Pacific Gas & Electric's exploration program. It is 
instructive to note that PG&E's utility exploration subsidiary 
acquired similar exploratory properties from a shareholder 
subsidiary, not for a monetary consideration, but rather for 
production-based consideration: alternating a six and one quarter 
percent (6.25%) overriding royalty or a percentage of the net 
profits. (This compares with the 7% royalty obtained by the 
ratepayers base.) DeGolyer & McNaughton, the respected oil and gas 
geology firm, pronounced this fair market value. (Tr. 1754.) 
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8. The Settlement is an agreement between the 
parties, and approval thereof by the Commission 
does not modify or in any way limit the 
jurisdiction of the Commission to require 
information from the parties and to investigate 
transactions under the Settlement in which the 
parties are involved. 
9. By adopting and approving the Stipulation, 
the Commission does not relinquish or limit any 
jurisdiction or statutory authority it possesses. 
While the scope of the Commission's statutory jurisdiction was not 
affected by the Settlement, properties sold at fair market value out H: 
of the utility (whether a used truck or a gas property) do 
individually become unregulated if they.are thereafter used in a 
non-utility manner. This diminution of jurisdiction (if it.can 
accurately be characterized as such) is an obvious consequence of 
the utility being an operating business and not a museum and is 
tacitly recognized by this Court's Wexpro opinion when it indicated 
that such transfers could take place for fair market value, 595 P.2d 
at 878. 
2. The Division and Committee Have Authority to Execute 
and Function Under the Agreement. 
No serious question should arise as to the legal capacity 
of the Committee either to enter into the Agreement or perform 
thereunder. That is legislatively settled. § 54-10-1, et~., 
U.C.A. The question of the author:ty of the Division to act as a 
~ party is judicially settled. In Utah Department of Business 
Regulation, Division of Public Utilities v. Public Service Comrn'n, 
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litigatious quest for the "last dime" of benefits, or the absolute 
vindication of a litigation position. The Settlement is in the 
public interest because while it recognizes the victory of the 
Division and the Committee before this Court in the Wexpro Case on 
the issue of the ratepayer having an interest in the oil 
properties, it also provides a mechanism to yield continuing 
benefits long into the future in the form of assured supplies of 
gas committed to the state at prices which will be among the lowest 
in the nation. (Tr. 1018, 1019, 1023, 1030, 1158, 1226, 1232, 
1252, 1272, 1273, 1280, 1319-20, 1398, 1485 and 1688). 
C. BY ITS ORDER, THE COMMISSION DID NOT WAIVE OTHERWISE LEGAL 
JURISDICTION 
1. /Commission Approval of the Agreement Could Not Result in 
the Relinquishing of Any Jurisdiction Over Any Entity.-
Administrative Services spends a great deal of effort 
belaboring the "straw man" that the Commission and the Division 
somehow relinquished jurisdiction or abandoned legal ·duties through 
the provisions of the Agreement, Stipulation, and Order. This is a 
position which is impossible to support. First, this Court found 
in Wexpro, as a matter of law, that state agencies cannot 
relinquish or waive their statutory jurisdiction. See also Utah 
-- --- ---
Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 151 P.2d 467 (1944). Second, 
the Commission explicitly stated in the Order that it was not 
relinquishing its statutory jurisdiction as a matter of law: 
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~U!~ 
614 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1980), this Court clearly interpreted the 
Division as "an advocate" represented by the Attorney General, the 
independently empowered legal officer of the State. 614 P.2d at 
1252. The Division functioned in good faith reliance on this 
Court's recognition of it as a party adyocate, empowered by 
54-7-10(1) U.C.A. to negotiate the Settlement subject to Commission 
approval. 
The only purpose of the Stipulation was to provide a 
commonly agreed to legal and factual basis for the Commission's 
approval of the Agreement. The Agreement is nothing more than a 
contract for the transfer of properties and money which provides a 
self-policing mechanism for internal monitoring and enforcement. At 
i tern 11.'2 of the S_tipula ti on, the Committee and the Di vision agreed 
not to argue that the properties transferred to Wexpro under the 
Agreement were thereafter subject to utility regulation because the 
Division and the Committee believe they are not. The Division and 
the Committee may at some future time be proven wrong when and if 
'the issue is brought before the Commission. But nowhere in the 
l~ i 
no 
Division's or the Committee's statutory mandate is the requirement 
to take any particular position on an issue. That is the freedom of 
an advocate. 
The Division was given the contractual role under the 
l1 
Agreement to monitor MFS and Wexpro compliance, with the Committee 
joining in the enforcement mechanisms. Because of the statutory 
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role of the Division and the technical expertise available to it, it 
22 is eminently suited to monitor compliance with the Agreement. 
3. Arbitration Outside of the Decision-Making Body Is 
Lawful and Consistent with Public Policy. 
Contrary to Administrative Serv~ces' charge (Admin. Serv. 
Br. at 69), the arbitration clause of the Agreement in no way "does 
away with" the Commission's jurisdiction or authority (Br. at 69). 
As stated earlier, the Agreement and Stipulation, which are 
contracts, were intended by the parties to be self-enforcing once 
the Commission found the terms to be just and reasonable. Thus, 
internal monitoring and arbitration remedies were initially 
employed. However, the Agreement affirmatively requires that 
enforceme'nt of an arbitration order dealing with utility questions 
be by the Commission, with non-utility orders enforceable by a 
22 In this regard, Administrative Services again evidences an 
inability to understand the Settlement when it states that the 
Division is "prohibited" from using experts who have previoqsly 
assisted it in the Wexpro matter, for monitoring of MFS and wexpro 
performance. (Br. at 7q). In fact, the Division may use any person 
it chooses to assist in monitoring, and has the continuing power to 
require MFS and Wexpro to produce information concerning their 
activities for Division investigation. (Agreement at VIII-4.) The 
only constriction is in regard to special funding provided in the 
Agreement, which covers the first several thousand dollars of 
expenses for one accountant and one petroleum engineer to 
specifically help monitor the Agreement. Only this internal funding 
is restricted against those who actively represented the Division 
and assisted in negotiating the Agreement. {Stipulation at, 8.2.) 
The Division certainly, as in the past, may hire whomever it wishes 
from its own budge~ funds. 
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competent court, such a court being fully able to decline jurisdic-
tion at the request of the Division or Committee if it found itself 
faced with a utility question. 
An agreement to arbitrate a dispute which arises under a 
contract is both valid and favored by the law. Latter v. Holsum 
Bread Co., 160 P.2d 421 (Utah 1945) (dissent of Wolfe, J.) Section 
78-31-1, U.C.A. as amended in 1977, expressly authorizes parties to 
agree "to submit to arbitration ••• any controversy which may 
arise in the future." By allowing for arbitration, the Legislature 
certainly did not constrict the jurisdiction of the courts, nor the 
Commission. Additionally, it should be noted that the Agreement and 
Stipulation are only contracts between the parties. The Commission 
is not a' party to or bound by the Agreement or Stipulation, and may 
investigate and enforce such orders as it deems appropriate. 
§§ 54-4-1, 2 U.C.A. 
D. THE CLEAR HOLDING OF THE COMMISSION'S ORDER RENDERS IT FINAL 
AND BINDING. 
The shareholders purport to be concerned that the 
t~~11 Commission's Order does not clearly express the intent that the 
t~ 
Order be a final, res judicata resolution of the issues covered by 
the Settlement. It is difficult to take this concern seriously in 
view of paragraph 6 of the Commission's Conclusions of Law: 
The Commission's findings and conclus'ions with 
regard to the transfer of properties and the 
allocation of benefits contemplated by the 
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Settlement, including the findings and 
conclusions that the transfer of properties and 
the allocation of benefits are reasonable and 
for market value and are in the public interest, 
are intended by the Commission to be final and 
not subject to future change (except through an 
appropriate and timely petition for rehearing or 
judicial review). The Commission so concludes 
because to ensure the proper development of said 
properties, the parties must be able to rely on 
the finality of the findings and conclusions in 
regard to the transfer of properties and 
apportionment of benefits. The Commission also 
is entitled to rely on the finality of its order. 
It is hard to imagine a clearer expression of the intent 
that the Order be a final resolution of the issues settled by the 
Agreement, Stipulation and Order and have res judicata effect. In 
view of this language, one suspects that the shareholders have 
raised the issue only for the purpose of obtaining the added 
comfort of this Court's holding that the Order is final and res 
judicata. Certainly, the Division and Committee have no objection 
to this Court giving the shareholders such further comfort with 
respect to the disposition of the properties, funds ~nd benefits 
covered by the Agreement. However, portions of the shareholders' 
brief seem intended to tempt this Court to go further and to rule 
that the Commission has finally resolved issues which the 
Commission clearly indicated it did not intend to resolve. For 
example: 
1. Can MFS restructure its business without a determin-
ation of the Commission that it is in the public interest? (Order 
at pp. 8-9). 
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2. Can MFS or its subsidiaries divest the Commission of 
jurisdiction to regulate MFS activities through FERC Applications? 
(Order at p. 10). 
3. Which activities or subsidiaries of MFS are subject 
to Commission regulation? (Order at p •. 5). 
4. Can the Commission order MFS as a utility to engage 
in an oil and gas exploration program involving properties not 
covered by the Settlement? (Order at p. 9). 
The Division and Committee do not at this point express 
any opinion as to how these issues should be resolved. The only 
purpose in mentioning these issues is to indicate that the 
Settlement and Order did not and were not intended to resolve 
these issues, and their resolution is not necessary to upholding 
the finality and ~ judicata effect of the Order Approving the 
Settlement. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record testimony and the reasons set forth 
above, the Commission's Order Approving the Settlement should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of July, 1982. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys 
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